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Philosophers and psychologists have experimentally explored various
aspects of people’s understandings of subjective experience based on their
responses to questions about whether robots “see red” or “feel frustrated,”
but the intelligibility of such questions may well presuppose that people
understand robots as experiencers in the first place. Departing from the
standard approach, I develop an experimental framework that distinguishes
between “phenomenal consciousness” as it is applied to a subject (an
experiencer) and to an (experiential) mental state and experimentally test
folk understandings of both subjective experience and experiencers. My
findings (1) reveal limitations in experimental approaches using “artificial
experiencers” like robots, (2) indicate that the standard philosophical
conception of subjective experience in terms of qualia is distinct from that of
the folk, and (3) show that folk intuitions do support a conception of qualia
that departs from the philosophical conception in that it is physical rather
than metaphysical. These findings have implications for the “hard problem” of
consciousness.
Keywords: Experimental Philosophy; Folk Conception of Subjective
Experience; Hard Problem of Consciousness; Phenomenal Consciousness;
Qualia; Subjective Experience
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1. Introduction
Does an intelligent robot’s visual experience of red differ from it
its experience of physical damage? One might say, “yes, of course.
Otherwise how could it take different appropriate action in each case?”
But many people might find the question senseless, because they do
not believe that such a robot would have conscious experience at all.
Philosophers and psychologists have experimentally explored various
aspects of people’s understandings of subjective experience based on
their responses to questions about whether such robots “see red” or
“feel frustrated,” but again, the intelligibility of such questions may
well presuppose that people understand robots as capable of
experience in the first place. The issue is that perhaps people
intuitively carve up the world first and foremost not in terms of
different (kinds of) mental states, but in terms of different (kinds of)
entities: those entities that can have any experiences (experiencers);
and those entities that cannot (nonexperiencers). If this is true—and
robots are seen as not experiencing anything—then asking about
perceived relative differences of mental states in robots is as
meaningful as asking “is it more efficient for a pig to fly or breath
underwater?”
In this paper, I undertake to further explore how people
understand subjective experience and test a standard methodological
approach to subjective experience that assumes that robots and
similar artifacts can be used unproblematically to test how people
think about subjective experience. To this end, instead of taking
experiential states as the fundamental thing to be investigated, I take
experiencers themselves as the starting point. I begin from Sytsma
and Machery’s (2010) results suggesting that philosophers and the folk
have rather different conceptions of subjective experience. I offer new
empirical results that further call into question the belief common
among philosophers that there is intuitive, pre-theoretical warrant for
thinking of a conscious experiencer in terms of qualitative or
phenomenal states (qualia). In particular, I will argue for the following
three claims:
1. One of the standard ways intuitions about conscious experience
have been tested, using attributions of mental states to simple
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robots, is deeply problematic because it fails to take into
account the more primitive concept of “an experiencer.”
2. The folk do not think of conscious experience in terms of the
standard philosophical conception of qualia/phenomenality,
contrary to the assumptions of most philosophers and in
keeping with Sytsma and Machery (2010).
3. The folk do have a conception of the qualitative aspect of
conscious experience that plays a role in their understanding of
conscious experience, contrary to Sytsma and Machery, and this
conception is distinct from the standard philosophical conception
because it is grounded in the physical as opposed to the
metaphysical.
In section 2, I sketch recent work on subjective experience,
focusing on Sytsma and Machery (2010). In section 3, I develop my
own experimental framework and present my results in two parts with
discussion in sections 4 (attributions of “experiencer”) and 5 (qualia
and experiencers). The final section is a general discussion of the
rationale, limitations, and implications of this study for accounts of
subjective experience, qualia, and the “hard” problem of
consciousness.

2. Conceptions of Subjective Experience
Philosophers most often theorize subjective experience in terms
of qualitative or phenomenological mental states (qualia). Qualia are
understood to be the “qualitative aspects” of conscious experience; if
someone is seeing a stop sign, then the particular way the red appears
in his/her phenomenological field is a red quale. There are qualia
associated with all sense modalities and other states like emotions,
moods, etc. Standard features of qualia include the following: they
appear practically ineffable, non-relational, non-public, and
immediately available to the subject. Consciousness and qualia are
often run together. Chalmers (1995), in setting up his “hard problem”
of consciousness, moves between Nagel’s (1974) “something it is like”
notion of an experiencer and the notion of qualia. But it is not obvious
that the problem of what makes an organism a subjective experiencer
in Nagel’s sense and the problem of what makes a state a qualitative
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state are so simply related. In recognition of this, experimental work
focusing on how people actually understand subjective experience
has emerged in the last few years.
Such studies can be found in the work of Robbins and Jack
(2006) on the conditions necessary for the folk to understand
something as having subjective experience, or as they put it, taking
the “phenomenological stance” toward the entity. Gray, Gray, and
Wegner’s (2007) empirical study of “mind perception” involved a
systematic examination of the factors involved in how people
recognize minds in which they documented two major dimensions to
such perception, “experience” (feeling pain, hunger, anger, etc.) and
“agency” (self-control, memory, morality, etc.). They had participants
compare a host of entities (e.g., frog, robot, God, infant, etc.) with
respect to the entities’ capacity to have mental states and found that
the states fell into natural groups along the dimensions of “experience”
and “agency.” Also, Knobe and Prinz (2008) have studied how “the
folk” understand subjective experience by analyzing how people
differentially attribute phenomenological and non-phenomenological
mental states to group agents (e.g., corporations); they argued that
the unwillingness of people to attribute phenomenological states to
group entities (in contrast to non-phenomenological states) indicate
that the folk recognize such a difference. But none of these studies
target precisely subjective experience in the broad sense of
“phenomenality” or the general qualitative nature of subjective
experience. Robbins and Jack (2006), with their focus on “hedonic
value,” miss the most general sense of subjective experience because
they do not include in their study the mundane subjective aspects of
perceptual states lacking in hedonic value, e.g., the particular way the
brown color of the bricks appears to me or the particular way the hum
of traffic in the background sounds. Similarly, Gray et al. (2007), while
using the term “experience” in their study, do not use it in the
philosophical sense of general subjective experience because they do
not include perceptual experience in their sense of it. Finally, Knobe
and Prinz (2008) do actually target subjective experience in its most
general phenomenal sense, but their choice to use in their study
collective entities like corporations, which can be shown to differ
functionally and behaviorally from individuals, confounds their
conclusions. I refer the reader to Sytsma and Machery (2009; 2010,
pp. 302–305) for further critical details. In what follows, Iwill make
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primary use of the critical framework of Sytsma and Machery (2010;
henceforth “S&M”) to contextualize and motivate this study, since they
do indeed address the question of subjective experience in its most
general sense.1
S&M set out explicitly to examine whether the “folk
understanding” of subjective experience has been “read off”
successfully by philosophers. S&M point out the pervasive
philosophical assumption of a deep link between subjective experience
and phenomenality. They write in the first sentence of their first
section, “for most contemporary philosophers, subjective experience is
characterized by its phenomenality” (2010, p. 300). S&M’s approach
involves finding experimental settings that cleave between the
“philosophical” conception and a distinctive folk conception. S&M
make use of a robot/human vignette as the backbone of their
experiment, analyzing the differential patterns of the attribution of
mental states by the participants to the vignette’s main character,
either a robot or a human. The independent variables were (1)
whether the main character in the vignette was a human or robot and,
(2) which mental state they were asked to attribute (or not) to the
main character.
In the first of their three studies, participants were randomly
assigned to one of four vignettes varying the subject between
human/robot (H or R), and varying the mental state between seeing
red/feeling pain (SR or FP). In the first version, the robot named
Jimmy (or human named Timmy) is instructed to move a red box from
a group of variously colored boxes. After it/he successfully moves the
box, participants were asked whether Jimmy/Timmy “saw red.” In the
second version, Jimmy/Timmy would again be instructed to move the
red box but would receive an electrical shock after picking up the box,
immediately drop the box, and move quickly away from it. Participants
were then asked whether Jimmy/Timmy “felt pain.” Participants
answered the question with a number on a seven-point scale with 1 ¼
clearly no, 4 ¼ not sure, and 7 ¼ clearly yes. The participants were
also pre-screened to determine whether they were philosophers (had
graduate training or were majoring in philosophy), and the results
were further broken down by the division of participants into
philosophers and non-philosophers. This constituted a test of the
hypothesis that non-philosophers and philosophers both conceive of
conscious experience (at least implicitly) in phenomenological terms,
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the rationale being that for those thinking in terms of
phenomenological consciousness, the attribution of perceptual
experience (red) and bodily sensation (pain) would go together. While
the prediction for philosophers was borne out, it was not for nonphilosophers; there was a significant difference in that nonphilosophers were willing to attribute “seeing red” to the robot and
philosophers were not. Neither group attributed “feeling pain” to the
robot, and they both attributed both pain and seeing red to the
human. These results suggest to S&M that “ordinary folk” conceive of
subjective experience differently from philosophers.
In the second study, S&M proposed to test (and ultimately
reject) a putative explanation of the attribution behavior of the nonphilosophers that avoided the conclusion that the difference was due
to non-philosophers not recognizing the phenomenological features of
experience. The alternative explanation is that there is a relevant
difference between internal senses (pain, emotions, etc.) and external
senses (perceptual experience), and that the non-philosophers were
willing to attribute external senses (seeing red) to the robot, and not
internal ones (feeling pain), but nonetheless understood sensing
phenomenally. In this experiment, participants were again divided into
four groups; the scenarios were modified to be about moving a box of
bananas (detecting it by odor from boxes of other distinctively smelly
things), and the robot/person was either successful or frustrated in
moving the box. Participants were asked whether the person/robot
smelled bananas in the successful scenarios and whether the
person/robot felt angry in the frustrating scenarios. If the internal/
external hypothesis were correct then the non-philosophers should be
willing to attribute smelling bananas to the robot (like they did with
“seeing red”), but not with “feeling anger.” The results did not bear
this out: “smelling bananas” was neither attributed (nor denied) to the
robot. The participants seemed ambivalent and divided as to whether
to attribute “smelling” to the robot. Thus the results were interpreted
as refuting the claim that the internal/external sense hypothesis
governed attributions. One possibility S&M acknowledge is that sense
modalities could vary in how external they are (e.g., vision being very
external and smelling less external), and thus a refined
internal/external hypothesis, one that recognizes sense modalities as
varying between more internal and less internal, might still be
consistent with the results.
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In the final study, S&M introduce a factor that they suggest
does explain the preceding attribution behavior, namely that mental
states with an “affective valence” (states that one either wants to be in
or wants to avoid being in) are ones that are associated with
subjective experience. As S&M put it, “we hypothesize that it is not
whether a mental state is the product of the external senses that
matters for the folk understanding of subjective experience, but
whether they associate that state with some hedonic value for the
subject” (2010, pp. 314–315). To test this positive account (and rule
out the refined internal/external hypothesis), they ran a similar
scenario test with a robot/human and three different olfactory cues:
familiar pleasant (banana); familiar unpleasant (vomit); and unfamiliar
and presumably valence neutral (isoamyl acetate). Again, the results
indicated that the participants were willing to ascribe all smells to the
human, but only the unfamiliar cue (isoamyl acetate) to the robot. The
scores for attributing familiar smells to the robot were not significantly
different from “not sure,” so while participants failed to attribute
familiar smells to the robot, neither did they deny that the robot
smelled the familiar objects. S&M argue that these results favor their
valence proposal over the alternative interior/exterior distance
proposal, because their valence account predicts the observed
response pattern, which falls along different valence lines. The
alternative hypothesis cannot explain the difference because the
smells were all from the same sense modality and hence did not
involve any difference in the “interior distance.”
S&M view the results of their studies as constituting preliminary
evidence that phenomenality does not figure into how nonphilosophers attribute states like seeing color, hearing a sound, feeling
a pain, etc. In their final section, S&M argue that since nonphilosophers do not recognize these diverse mental states as united by
having phenomenological properties, it follows that phenomenological
experience cannot be taken to be the manifestly obvious feature of our
mental life that the philosophers pushing the “hard problem” of
consciousness need it to be (2010, p. 321). S&M are advancing an
important skeptical line against the “hard problem.” In particular, they
have raised serious doubts about whether non-philosophers have the
same conception of phenomenality that philosophers do. There are,
however, several problematic aspects of their study that threaten to
undermine the support for their conclusion.2
Philosophical Psychology, Vol 27, No. 6 (2014): pg. 862-889. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis (Routledge) and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis (Routledge)] does
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Taylor & Francis (Routledge).

7

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

The first concern is that asking participants to attribute mental
states to the robot character might not be an effective way to test
attribution behavior. Robots and other artifacts like computers and
artificial intelligence may from the start embody, for us, a certain
“valence” in that they produce in us an aversive feeling of uncanniness
when presented as experiencers. Gray and Wegner (2012) have
documented an “uncanniness” effect of just this kind: machines that
appear to experience states like pain, hunger, fear, and other
emotions strike people as uncanny. S&M suggest that the link between
subjective experience and phenomenality “only becomes obvious as
one is trained into a particular way of thinking about the mind” (2010,
p. 323); I suspect that such training also obviates our natural sense of
“uncanniness” and explains why philosophers’ intuitions seem to point
in different directions. I return to this below, but the upshot is that for
some reason, one certainly worth exploring, the folk begin with rather
deep and pervasive intuitions that artifacts (as opposed to “natural”
life) categorically cannot be experiencers and that this governs their
attribution behavior.
A further concern is that S&M’s approach does not push the
empirical questioning back quite far enough. Their results, though
preliminary, do seem to provide serious reason to doubt the intuitive
grounding of the received philosophical treatment of subjective
experience in terms of phenomenality. But while the folk may not
conceive of subjective experience in phenomenological terms,
understood in the usual philosophical way, it is moving too quickly to
dismiss altogether a phenomenological component in mental state
attribution. Putting “phenomenality” to more direct empirical test is
called for to shed light on the folk conceptual dynamics around
subjective and qualitative experience.
Finally, note that S&M use what might be termed an “indirect”
approach to test how the folk think of subjective experience: they test
the willingness of participants to attribute various mental states, which
we assume include phenomenality or other subjective features of
interest, to a robot and then “infer” to the best explanation of the
attribution behavior in terms of the participants’ conceptual scheme
regarding subjective experience. This approach is indirect in that it
requires inference back from attribution tendencies to how the
participants are conceiving of things in order to explain the attribution
behavior. It has the virtue of not depending on the participant’s ability
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to articulate implicit understandings that govern their attribution
behavior, and of course, is less susceptible to the bias that may occur
with more direct approaches. I will argue below, however, that utilizing
a more direct approach has its own distinct advantages.

3. Experimental Design
Departing from S&M, the theoretical framework in this study
centers on the notion of “being an experiencer” at a creature level
rather than on experiential mental states. The explanandum is
subjective conscious experience, understood in Nagel’s “something it
is like” (SIL) sense. An entity is an experiencer when there is
“something it is like” to be that entity. I depart from S&M in that I do
not collapse being an experiencer (having SIL) into having a particular
mental state (or set of states) with the second-order property of
“there being something it is like to have it.” For purposes here, the
reigning philosophical account of qualia as the phenomenological
properties of mental states is taken as a starting point, and the central
question is the extent to which folk conceptions agree with this
account. (I move back and forth between the terms “qualia” and
“phenomenality,” depending on context, with the understanding that
qualia are the phenomenological properties of mental states.)
The research questions for this study are (1) the ways in which
the application of the notion of “being an experiencer” in Nagel’s SIL
sense depend on psychological, biological, behavioral, or
computational factors of the putative experiencer, and (2)
whether/how subjects make use of a concept of qualia in attributing
“being an experiencer.” The study itself involved a series of questions
in two parts, the first exploring how subjects attribute “being an
experiencer” and the second probing their understanding of qualia and
the extent to which it affects their attributing “being an experiencer.”
In part 1, participants were asked to assign a degree of confidence to
whether various entities are experiencers, and in part 2, participants
were asked degree of confidence questions concerning being an
experiencer in situations in which qualia and other related factors were
manipulated. Instructions were designed to attune subjects to the
anchoring cases for “being an experiencer,” namely the sense of being
an experiencer we have from our own case on one end, and on the
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other end, simple artifacts generally understood to be lacking inner
experience.

4. Experimental Study Part 1: Attributing “Being
an Experiencer”
This first part of the study tested the attribution behavior of
subjects with respect to particular kinds of entities. It was designed to
test both whether the two anchoring cases in the instructions were
comprehensible to participants, and also what factors play a role in
how “being an experiencer” is employed by participants.

4.1. Participants
Participants (N ¼ 73) were university students drawn from
three sections of an informal logic class taught by the same instructor.
The philosophical content of the course is minimal. The gender
breakdown was 47% (34) male, 53% (39) female.

4.2. Materials and Procedures
Participants completed a questionnaire at the beginning of a
class. The instructor administered the questionnaire and was not
informed of the research questions. The participants were given the
following prompt:
As we all know, each of us as conscious human beings have an
“inner life.” We are aware of things going on around us and
inside our minds. In other words, there is something it is like to
be each of us at any given moment: the sum total of what we
are sensing, thinking, feeling, etc. We are experiencers.
On the other hand, things like thermostats, burglar alarms, and
bread machines do not have an inner life: there is not anything
it is like to be these objects, despite the fact that they can
monitor conditions around them and make appropriate things
happen at appropriate times. They are not experiencers.
They were then presented with a list of twenty items and asked
to indicate, for each item, whether that item was an experiencer using
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a seven-point Likert scale anchored with 1 ¼ clearly not an
experiencer, 7 ¼ clearly an experiencer, and 4 ¼ unsure. The
twenty items they evaluated were:
1. a person in coma _________.
2. a virus _________.
3. Spock (from Star Trek) _________.
4. seaweed _________.
5. Helen Keller (when alive) _________.
6. a complicated computerized surveillance system visually
monitoring a house and also monitoring the sounds,
temperature, and odors in order to detect intruders or
environmental changes and correct them _________.
7. C3PO (from Star Wars) _________.
8. a dead person _________.
9. the Statue of Liberty _________.
10. a computer program exactly simulating the behavior of your
neurons _________.
11. a dolphin _________.
12. your best friend _________.
13. a computer _________.
14. Data (from Star Trek) _________.
15. Bambi _________.
16. a human embryo _________.
17. God _________.
18. a computer program exactly simulating the behavior of your
eurons in a robot _________.
19. R2D2 (from Star Wars) _________.
20. a person under general anesthesia _________.
Participants were also instructed to explain their responses if
necessary.

4.3. Results and Discussion
The mean values and standard deviations for the twenty items
are reported in table 1. Results are graphed with a 99% confidence
interval in figure 1. Table 1 contains the results of a one-sample t-test
for each of the items testing the null hypothesis that the mean equals
4 (the “unsure” response). The t-tests provide rough indication of
which entities were considered experiencers. In all the tests but one
the results were significant at p, 0.001; the test for the entity Spock
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was significant at p, 0.01. As a result, 9 of the 20 entities were ranked
as experiencers and 11 were ranked as nonexperiencers;
there were no entities with a mean response of “unsure.”
In descending order of means, the experiencers were: your best
friend; Helen Keller; dolphin; God; person under general anesthesia;
Bambi; human embryo; Spock; and person in coma. The entities
identified as non-experiencers (again in descending order of means)
were: C3PO; Data; seaweed; R2D2; a virus; a computer simulation of
your brain in a robot; a computer simulation of your brain; a
computerized house surveillance system; a computer; a dead person;
and the Statue of Liberty.
The mean scores for the twenty items were tested using an
ANOVA with repeated measures and a Greenhouse-Geisser correction
(Mauchly’s Sphericity test was significant; p, 0.001, x2 ¼ 656(189), e
¼ 0.448). The mean scores for being an experiencer were statistically
significantly different; F(8.51, 536) ¼ 122, p , 0.001, h2 ¼ 0.659. A
Bonferroni adjustment for all 190 multiple pairwise comparisons would
have involved an excessive loss of power (aB ¼ 0.05/190, 0.0003), so
instead a False Detection Rate method (FDR) was employed with aBY
¼ 0.007 used for post-hoc comparisons (see table 2).3 Three discrete
breaks occurred (a) between best friend (the experiencer with the
highest mean) and Helen Keller; (b) between the experiencer with
the lowest mean (person in coma) and the non-experiencer with the
highest mean (C3P0), naturally dividing the experiencers from the
non-experiencers; and (c) between the virus and the robot with a
computer brain simulation. Thus a natural partition using the FDR
subsets involves subsets 1, 2 þ 3, 5, 6, 7 þ the Statue of Liberty. In
this partition, the first subset consists of the anchoring case (best
friend), the second subset of slightly more complicated people or
people-like entities (higher animals, anesthetized and impaired people,
God), the third subset of marginal experiencers (fictional animals and
aliens, embryo, person in coma), the fourth subset of the high nonexperiencers (fictional anthropomorphized robots, virus, seaweed),
and finally in the fifth subset were the low non-experiencers (explicitly
computerized items, corpse, Statue of Liberty).
A Principle Component Analysis (PCA) was employed to
transform the original variables onto uncorrelated components to
simplify the data structure, eliminate redundant and unreliable
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descriptors, and reveal interpretable factors. The relatively low sample
size (N ¼ 73) in this study indicated that the number of variables (20)
ought to be reduced to 12 or 13 so that the standard ratio of 5:1 for
sample size to variable be maintained. Only 3 of the 20 items failed to
correlate at least 0.3 with at least one other item (embryo, God,
corpse) indicating factorability. Individual measures of sampling
adequacy on the full 20 variables indicated four variables with low
(,0.5) measures: corpse; dolphin; God; and embryo. The KaiserMeyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.689, below the
target value of 0.7, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (x2
(190) ¼ 546, p, 0.001).
After removing the four variables with low sampling adequacy,
the PCA method was used and six components converged with
eigenvalues. 1, explaining 68% of the total variance. Inspection of the
component matrix indicated that one component depended on only the
two variables with most extreme means and smallest variances (best
friend, Statue of Liberty) and one component on only one variable
(Helen Keller). After removing these three variables and extracting
four components, the rotated component matrix revealed one variable
(computerized house) with non-zero loadings on more than two
components; this variable was removed. The resultant extraction
consisting of the four components explaining 73% of the variance was
rotated (Varimax with Kaiser Normalization) so that the rotated factors
cumulatively explained 28%, 16%, 14%, and 14% of the total
variance, respectively. In the final extraction, all individual variable
adequacy scores were above 0.5, the group Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
sampling adequacy score was above 0.7, and all the communalities
were above 0.5. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was again significant (x2
(66) ¼ 363, p, 0.001). The rotated component matrix revealed the
near simple structure shown in table 3.
The first and primary component should be interpreted as
whether the entity in question is an artifact, as it loaded on all and
only the artifact variables. The second component loaded significantly
(jxj . 0.5) on the two “incapacitated” humans variables, but
interestingly, also saliently (0.4 # jxj , 0.5) in the opposite direction
(negatively) on the two variables for computerized human brain/body)
simulations. This result is suggestive of Gray and Wegner’s (2012)
uncanniness findings: humans who lack importantly human qualities
and artifacts that appear to have such qualities strike people as
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uncanny. Accordingly, component 2 can be interpreted as a measure
of uncanniness in roughly this sense.4 The third component loaded
significantly on nonhuman living entities (seaweed and virus), and
next (though not saliently) on Bambi. Finally, the fourth component
loaded significantly on Spock and Bambi and seemed interpretable as
a measure of human-likeness or anthropomorphicity. The internal
consistency for the four factors was tested using Cronbach’s alpha. The
descriptive statistics for the components, Artifact (N ¼ 6, M ¼ 2.35,
SD ¼ 1.26, a ¼ 0.85), Uncanniness (N ¼ 2, M ¼ 5.21, SD ¼ 1.34, a
¼ 0.74), Living (N ¼ 2, M ¼ 2.79, SD ¼ 1.52, a ¼ 0.71), and
Anthropomorphic (N ¼ 2, M ¼ 4.94, SD ¼ 1.91, a ¼ 0.74) indicated
“good” internal consistency.
The results indicate that the assumptions behind the anchoring
cases of being an experiencer matched the participants’ own
understanding: the significantly highest/lowest mean answers and
lowest standard deviations were for “best friend” and “Statue of
Liberty,” as predicted. Further indication that the participants’
understanding of “being an experiencer” fit well with Nagel’s
“something it is like” articulation is that in addition to ordinary and
variously incapacitated people, animals too were readily accorded
“experiencer” status, while at the other end, dead people and artificial
entities described as “computers” are clearly not conceived of as
experiencers in this sense. Fictional aliens, fictional anthropomorphized
intelligent robots, embryos, people in comas, viruses, and seaweed
were less conclusively non-experiencers.

5. Experimental Study Part 2: Qualia and “Being
an Experiencer”
The second part of study probed how the concept of qualia is
related to attributions of experiencer. In particular, it attempted to
investigate whether subjects employ the notion of qualia and if so,
what sense of qualia subjects employ, and how the absence or
attenuation of qualia affects their willingness to attribute “being an
experiencer.”
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5.1. Participants
The participants consisted of the same university students (N ¼
73) drawn from three sections of an informal logic class taught by the
same instructor; the second part of the study was conducted during
the same session as the first.

5.2. Materials and Procedures
Participants completed a second questionnaire immediately
following the first. Again, the instructor administered the questionnaire
and was not informed of the research questions. The prompt and
questions themselves from part 1 were intended to further attune
participants to the notion of being an experiencer in Nagel’s sense. The
term ‘qualia’ was not defined directly nor used in any of the questions.
Participants were simply given the following directions:
Please answer the following questions using the scale below.
1
2
3
4 5 6 7
|
|
|
certainly not not sure certainly so

They were then asked ten questions (several requiring two
responses). All but the last one involved utilizing the above Likert
scale; question 10 required a written response. Two of the questions
were asked in two different ways (questions 2 and 7). The ten
questions in order were:
1. Imagine a medical procedure that would remove your inner experience
without affecting your brain, so from the outside you would remain
unchanged physically and behaviorally. Do you think such a procedure is
possible? ________.
2. [Version A] Could a robot EVER feel anxious? _________.
[Version B] Could a robot EVER be anxious? _________. [Bold emphasis
indicates difference in versions.]
3. Can we ever be sure that you see red the way another person
does?_________.
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4. Imagine a person who feels no sense of guilt or right or wrong about any
actions whatsoever.
Is such an entity possible? _________.
Would such a person be an experiencer? _________.
5. Imagine a person without any emotions whatsoever.
Is such an entity possible? _________.
Would such a person be an experiencer? _________.
6. Imagine that a completely color blind person got an implant that encoded
colors in her visual field with numbers indicating colors, so for example,
the sky on a clear day was indicated with a number 1 to indicate blue.
Would such a person be able to see blue? _________.
7. [Version A] Imagine another kind of intelligent creature (from a
society much like ours) whose experience didn’t consist of the
subjective feels, tastes, colors, sounds, etc., but rather of objective
measurements of pressure, direction, chemical composition, light
frequency, physically helpful/harmful environmental factors, etc. [Bold
emphasis indicates difference in versions.]
[Version B] Imagine an intelligent robot whose experience didn’t consist
of the subjective feels, tastes, colors, sounds, etc., but rather of objective
measurements of pressure, direction, chemical composition, light
frequency, physically helpful/harmful environmental factors, etc. [Bold
emphasis indicates difference in versions.]
Is such an entity possible? _________.
Would such an entity be an experiencer? _________.
8. Imagine a person physically and behaviorally identical to you in all ways
but who had no inner experience at all.
Is such a person possible? _________.
Would such an entity be an experiencer? _________.
9. Imagine a person whose senses were destroyed by disease, but who had
been given artificial senses that reported directly to their speech center
things like “wall up ahead” or “bird singing ten feet to right.”
Would such an entity be an experiencer? _________.
10. Imagine that Dan, a professional coffee taster for years, has recently
begun to fail competency tests that he used to pass all the time. He has
begun to confuse coffee type X with coffee type Y, and vice versa. For him
coffee type X now tastes just like coffee type Y used to and vice versa. List
all the explanations you can think of that might explain this. (Continue on
back if necessary.)

Participants were randomly assigned version A (N ¼ 36) or B (N ¼ 37)
of the instrument that corresponded to the versions of questions 2 and
7 indicated above. The two versions of question 2 simply varied in the
wording of whether a robot could “EVER feel anxious” (version A) or
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“EVER be anxious” (version B).5 On question 7, the feature that varied
was whether the entity was an “intelligent creature (from a society
much like ours)” (version A) or whether the entity was “an intelligent
robot” (version B).6

5.3. Results and Discussion
The mean values and standard deviations for questions 1–9
from part 2 are given in table 4, and graphical results with a 99%
confidence interval are given in figure 2. Table 4 also contains the
results of a one-sample t-test for each of the items testing the null
hypothesis that the mean equals 4 (the “unsure” response). Again, the
t-tests provide rough indication of whether the mean response
indicates an affirmative, negative, or unsure answer.
The absent qualia/zombie questions 1 (M ¼ 2.30, SD ¼ 1.60)
and 8a (M ¼ 2.55, SD ¼ 1.78) indicate that non-philosophers do not
think such cases are possible, as the means differed significantly from
the “unsure” level 4, with t(72) ¼ 29.09, p , 0.001, d ¼ 1.06 for
question 1 and t(72) ¼ 26.97, p , 0.001, d ¼ 0.82 for question 8a.
The question exploring intuitions about having a sense of guilt and
right/wrong (question 4b, M ¼ 5.25, SD ¼ 1.85) indicated that such a
sense is not taken as necessary for being an experiencer, t(72) ¼
5.77, p , 0.001, d ¼ 0.67.
On the other hand, having emotions seems to neatly divide nonphilosophers: the responses indicated “unsure” (question 5a: M ¼
3.73, SD ¼ 2.31; 5b: M ¼ 4.00, SD ¼ 2.24) with both means failing
to differ significantly from the level of 4. The frequencies of responses
for whether such a person would be an experiencer further bear out
this uncertainty, i.e., 44% indicating “no,” 41% indicating “yes,” and
15% “unsure.” The numbers were similar for whether these persons
are possible. Question 3, which asked whether we could be sure
another person sees red the way we do (M ¼ 3.07, SD ¼ 2.00),
indicated that participants do not think one could be sure that red
things appear the same to everyone; t(70) ¼ 23.91, p , 0.001, d ¼
0.46. The questions concerning unusual sensory qualia (questions 6
and 9) split in an interesting way. Question 6, concerning whether a
color blind person with 1’s in his/her visual field indicating blue could
“see blue,” indicated that non-philosophers thought “no” (M ¼ 3.00,
SD ¼ 1.97 with t(71) ¼ 24.30, p , 0.001, d ¼ 0.51). Yet with respect
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to whether a person whose sense modalities were wired directly to
their speech centers (question 9, M ¼ 4.75, SD ¼ 1.88), the
consensus was that the person would be an experiencer, t(72) ¼ 3.42,
p , 0.01, d ¼ 0.40. Thus folk attribution of sensory experience does
seem to require a qualitative aspect in order to phenomenologically
“see” as opposed to informationally “detect” blue.
The mean scores for the ten version-independent items (1, 3,
4a& b, 5a & b, 6, 8a & b, 9) were also tested using a one-way
repeated-measures ANOVA. Mauchly’s Sphericity test indicated the
assumption of sphericity was violated, x2(44) ¼ 122.2, p , 0.001, so
a Greenhouse-Geisser correction of e ¼ 0.732 was used. The ANOVA
shows that the mean scores are significantly different; F(6.59, 454.6)
¼ 33.4, p , 0.001, h2 ¼ 0.326. A Bonferroni adjustment for the 45
multiple pairwise comparisons was used for post-hoc pairwise
comparisons with aB ¼ 0.05 / 45 ¼ 0.00111. Comparisons of
particular interest were among the six parallel questions asking about
the possibility and experiencer status of a person without a sense of
guilt (4a, 4b), a person without any emotions (5a, 5b), and a person
identical to the participant but without inner experience (8a, 8b); the
results indicated no significant difference between the means of the
possibility and experiencer status of each of these pairs, and each of
the means for the possibilities were mutually significantly different (4a
– 5a – 8a), as were the means for the experiencer status (4b – 5b –
8b). The two absent qualia/zombie possibility questions (1, 8a)
showed no significant difference from each other, and both differed
significantly from the means for the emotionless experiencer question
(5a, 5b), which again did not differ significantly from the unsure
response level of 4.
The results for the version-dependent questions (2, 7p, and 7e)
are also given in table 4 and the results are graphed with a 99%
confidence interval in figure 3. Table 4 also contains the results of a
one-sample t-test for each version (A and B) of the three items (total
of six), testing the null hypothesis that the mean equals 4 (the
“unsure” response). In terms of the rough direction of the responses,
both versions of the “robot being anxious” question (2) had means
indicating “no” (A: M ¼ 2.86, SD ¼ 2.00; B: M ¼ 2.41, SD ¼ 1.82) as
t-tests were significant; A: t(35) ¼ 23.41, p , 0.01, d ¼ 0.57; B: t(36)
¼ 25.34, p , 0.001, d ¼ 0.88. In contrast, both versions of the
possibility of an “objective experiencer” question (7e) had means
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indicating “yes” (A: M ¼ 4.86, SD ¼ 1.61; B: M ¼ 5.16, SD ¼ 2.06);
t-tests were again significant; A: t(35) ¼ 3.22, p , 0.01, d ¼ 0.54; B:
t(36) ¼ 3.43, p , 0.01, d ¼ 0.56. Finally, an interesting divergence
was found in the means of the experiencer status question (7e) of the
difference versions of the “objective experiencer.” The means for the
intelligent creature version (A: M ¼ 5.08, SD ¼ 1.86) and the
intelligent robot version (B: M ¼ 2.70, SD ¼ 1.70) were significantly
different from the “unsure” response (A: t (35) ¼ 3.450, p , 0.01, d ¼
0.58; B: t(36) ¼ 24.65, p , 0.001, d ¼ 0.76), but in opposite
directions: the creature was understood to be an experiencer and the
robot as a non-experiencer.
An analysis of variance showed that, indeed, there was a
significant effect due to the kind of intelligent entity (A: natural
“creature” versus B: artificial “robot”) for whether it was considered an
experiencer in question 7e; F(1,71) ¼ 32.7, p , 0.001, h2 ¼ 0.315
(Levene’s Test indicated equal variances; F ¼ 0.002, p ¼ 0.96). The
ANOVA found no effect due to kind of entity on the possibility of
experience (7p), F(1,71) ¼ 0.483, p ¼ 0.49, h2 ¼ 0.006, with
Levene’s Test non-significant at F ¼ 3.09, p ¼ 0.08. Finally, in
keeping with S&M’s results, there was not a significant difference
between the
wordings (being anxious or feeling anxious) in question 2, F(1,71) ¼
1.04, p ¼ 0.31, h2 ¼ 0.014, and Levene’s Test non-significant at F ¼
0.69, p ¼ 0.41.
The final question, a variation of Dennett’s (1988) Chase and
Sandborn coffee taster “intuition pump,” tested per S&M’s (2010, p.
323) suggestion whether non-philosophers might be readily nudged
into recognizing a perhaps latent conception of qualia. In it,
participants were asked to list all possible explanations for the coffee
taster’s “interchanged qualia.” The 123 responses offered were
categorized into 15 groups with results in table 5 and figure 4.
The vast majority (111, 90.2%) of all responses fell into one of
the following four non-phenomenological categories: taste bud issues
(explanation types 1, 2, 3, 4); old age/disease (explanation types 7,
8); brain/nerve damage (explanation type 10); and too used to the
taste (explanation type 9). There were only seven (5.7%) of the 123
explanations that offered reasonably clear phenomenological
responses; these explanations fell into three types (11, 12, 13): the
memory of the taste changed (two participants); the perception of the
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taste changed (one participant); and altered inner experience (four
participants). Notably, five of the seven responders offering a
phenomenological explanation had indicated that they had at least one
prior philosophy class. Finally, there were four responses (4%) of selfdeception/doubt (explanation types 5, 6) that one could possibly
interpret as phenomenological. Especially given that the previous
questions and prompts in the experiment asked participants
repeatedly to think about “inner experience” and its variability, this
direct approach to awaking putative latent intuitions concerning qualia/
phenomenality provided no evidence that any such latent concepts
exist.

6. General Discussion
In this section, I discuss the rationale for the experimental
framework (section 6.1), the implications of the results for
experimental methodology and general understanding of putative
“artificial experiencers” (section 6.2), the relationship between
conscious subjective experience and qualia (section 6.3), limitations of
the study (section 6.4), and implications for the “hard” problem of
consciousness (section 6.5).

6.1. Theoretical Framework: Direct versus Indirect
Design
Part of the experimental design involves assessing subjects’
direct responses. For example, the participants in the study were
asked to assign a degree of certainty to whether an entity under
consideration is an experiencer. This direct approach, employing from
the start the notion of an experiencer as it does, can be thought of as
“front loading” a concept. However, no contentious philosophical
assumptions were made about it; the experiment simply explores the
commonly held notion that certain things are experiencers and others
are not.
A natural concern when one attempts experimentally to test
direct responses is bias. The problem of bias in experiments with direct
questions may come up in various ways, including in particular
demand characteristics, the experimental artifact introduced
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when participants behave out of a perhaps implicit and unconscious
interpretation of the purpose of the experiment. Another possible
source arises from the difference between the employment of a
concept and making judgments about such employment.
In this setting, however, it is not clear that demand characteristic bias
will be a factor since the questions do not concern “socially loaded”
areas like sexual practice, drug use, or racial attitudes in which
demand bias is clearly a concern.7 Similarly, while a dualprocess
background hypothesis might suggest that a higher-level report is
distorting the lower-level process of interest, given that this study’s
interest is not necessarily in such low-level processes, this sort of bias
is not a clear concern either.
This is not to say there is not the possibility for bias arising out
of the explicit structure of part of the experiment, but rather that the
likelihood is not a great concern here because (1) low-level distortions
from a dual process situation are not particularly germane since the
target is a higher conceptual dynamic, and (2) demand characteristics,
which typically play out in attitudinal studies with a social expectation
valence, are not clearly indicated because the topics involved are not
generally socially contentious. It was not feasible to implement a postexperimental questionnaire, which is a standard technique to test for
demand characteristics. I did, however, employ a measure to counter
such bias: the administrator of the experiment was not informed of the
research hypothesis or topic.
There is a complementary concern when one attempts
experimentally to test attribution behavior with a concept like
“experiencer,” namely, that subjects may simply lack an
understanding of the concepts required (subjective experience, qualia,
etc.) to make responses meaningful. But in this case, concern about
subjects not having the requisite concepts may be obviated by the fact
that the central concepts involved are indeed highly recognizable by
the folk, namely the “how colors look to each of us” sense of qualia
and the “something it is like to be” sense of an experiencer. And as
anyone who has taught these concepts in philosophy or psychology
can attest—there is enough of an understanding in the folk of the
“what it is like to see red” notion to immediately grasp the
epistemological conundrum to which it gives rise. What is more, the
case at hand is different from cases like asking subjects whether
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there can be truths in math that cannot be proven or whether the
largest prime number is odd or even.8 Of course, in such cases one
may not conclude much of anything about whether the folk agree with
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem or Euclid’s proof that there are an
infinite number of primes. But this study targets how folk
understandings of a relatively ordinary concept (not precisely defined
terms like even, odd, prime, proof, or truth) compare with “expert”
understandings of these same ordinary phenomena, not results
deduced from propositions about these phenomena. In asking
participants to employ their concept of “how red looks” to novel and
unusual situations, the understanding is that how they apply it will
shed light on its contours as a folk concept, not whether they actually
disagree with Jackson’s Mary argument.

6.2. Artificial Experiencers
The results from parts 1 and 2 make a clear case for a
categorical resistance in the folk to attributing experiencer status to an
“artificial entity.” Participants in part 1 were not just less inclined to
rank “artificial” beings as experiencers than they were people and
animals, but also less than very “low” life forms. Indeed, the results
suggest a categorical refusal to consider as an experiencer any kind of
“artificial” being (computer, robot with an exact simulation of a brain
for its “brain,” android, etc.). No “artificial” entity even received a “not
sure” score for experiencer. The highest mean for such an entity was
for the fictional character C3PO (M ¼ 3.21). The mean score for the
old philosophical standby—a robot with an exact simulation (neuron for
neuron) of a human brain for its “brain”—was significantly lower than
that of a virus.
The results of the PCA from part 1 indicate that the largest
factor in attributing experiencer status is whether the entity is an
artifact. But the second factor, the uncanniness component, also
contributes to a further categorical consideration against artifacts as
experiencers. Gray and Wegner’s (2012) uncanny valley documented
uncanniness on two poles: on one end, artifacts possessing typical
experiential responsiveness; and on the other end, though less
strongly, humans lacking typical experiential responsiveness. The
uncanniness found here worked in different directions on each end; it
effectively “changed signs” from one end to the other. Being uncanny
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in the direction of humanlike artifacts worked against attributing
experience (negative loads) and being uncanny in the other direction
of unresponsive humans worked in favor of attributing experience
(positive loads). Thus, uncanniness worked against attributing
experience only in the direction of artifacts.
Even when the entity is described as one “whose experience
doesn’t consist of subjective feels, tastes, colors . . . but rather of
objective measurements of pressure,” if the entity is an “intelligent
robot” (version B), then participants do not consider it an experiencer
(question 7). On the other hand, if the entity is “another kind of
intelligent creature (from a society much like ours)” (version A), then
it is considered an experiencer. It is hard not to see this as evidence
for a deep-seated intuition that artificial entities are categorically not
experiencers. And importantly, this intuition doesn’t seemto be based
on the absence/presence of a (sensory) qualitative aspect, since the
non-human “intelligent creature” lacks the qualitative aspect as well
and is still ranked as an experiencer.
This “robot result” has immediate consequences for S&M’s
approach. If there is at work in the folk something like a categorical
understanding of such entities as non-experiencers, as there seems to
be, this gives us independent reason to think that there is a
systematically different sense of “seeing red” at work. S&M (2010, p.
309) consider and reject an objection along these lines. The objection
is that “seeing red is ambiguous,” that it may be used informationally
or phenomenologically. S&M reject this (1) because it would be ad hoc
without an explanation of the difference, and (2) because distributions
of folk responses (almost all attributing “seeing red” or unsure) do not
support the ambiguous understanding, because such an ambiguity
would lead us to expect that responses would be evenly distributed.
The results of this study, however, do offer an explanation of the
ambiguity, namely, that the informational reading of “seeing red” is
engaged in people when the entity under consideration is understood
as not being an experiencer, and so S&M’s response (1) fails. As for
response (2), if something systematic having to do with SIL is at work,
then one would not expect a flat distribution of responses: the
objection is not that the folk resolution of the ambiguity is “random,”
but rather that it is dependent upon whether subjects understand the
entity in question as being an experiencer.9 Thus the clustered
response in favor of the attribution of seeing red is not unexpected.
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S&M’s conclusion, that folk and philosophical conceptions of
phenomenality differ, is confounded by the use of robots in their
experiments. As I argue below, they are right that the conceptions
differ, but not because the folk have no conception of phenomenality.
Rather, folk phenomenality is importantly different from the
philosophical sense in that it is grounded in the physical as opposed to
the metaphysical nature of the experiencer.

6.3. Unlinking Conscious Experience and Qualia
That participants have a concept of some sense of qualia or
“phenomenality” is clear from the results in part 2. Question 3 shows
that the participants’ understanding of “seeing red” involves a
component that cannot be verified from a third-person perspective.
Such a private and ineffable component is typically a defining feature
of qualia or “phenomenality.” The point, however, is that there must
be “something it is like” to see red for it to be unverifiable. Further,
question 6’s responses suggest that “seeing blue” involves a
“qualitative aspect” or at least a constraint on “what it would be like”
for a SIL-conscious entity in order for it to “see blue,” as opposed to
detecting blue. In particular, a color blind person who has blue
indicated in his/her visual field symbolically by 1’s does not “see blue.”
As I argued above, it is unhelpful to think of phenomenality as a
property of mental states in the way at work in S&M’s study, though
understood as such, S&M are right that the folk don’t employ such
phenomenality in their attributions of mental states. Nonetheless,
something like phenomenality is required to explain the subjective and
qualitative components brought out in questions 3 and 6.
I suggest that we recognize the participants as employing a
metaphysically thin concept of the qualitative character of conscious
experience, rather than traditional phenomenality or qualia. To draw
this out, distinguish between the qualitative and subjective characters
of conscious experience. Following Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009),
notice that conscious experience has at least the following two
aspects: a qualitative character and a “for-me” or subjective character.
When I experience a clear blue sky, the experience has a q-character
(qualitative) of “bluishness” and an s-character (subjective) of “being
mine” in that intimate, first-person, subjective sense. Utilizing this
distinction, we can understand SIL-consciousness, the question of
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what makes an entity an experiencer in Nagel’s sense, as
fundamentally about the s-character of conscious experience, and
questions about the nature of qualitative (or “phenomenological”)
states as fundamentally about the q-character. This is not to say that
SIL-consciousness involves only the s-character, and that qualia
involve only the q-character; empirical work will be required to decide
this. I am suggesting only that SIL-consciousness is not conceptually
equivalent to qualia, and that while SIL-consciousness may well be
implicated in both the s-character and q-character, qualia is essentially
about q-character and can, in principle, be empirically investigated
independently of s-character. Precisely how SIL-consciousness and
qualia are related in actual experiencers is an empirical question;
indeed, work is being done in neuroscience that reinforces the
distinction and sheds light on their relationship. Such work provides
further empirical reason to doubt that SIL-consciousness and the
qualitative character of subjective experience will turn out to be
inseparable (much less identical) from a scientific perspective.10
Invoking a q-character sense of “reddishness” or “bluishness”
would explain the responses to questions 3 and 6: in the context of a
SIL-conscious entity, the attribution of mental states such as “seeing
red” involve a conception of the q-character of the experience. Having
a q-character is the sense in which at least some mental state
attributions to SIL-conscious agents involve “phenomenality. ”Many
philosophers will be quick to make the jump from this q-character to
qualia in the full-blown philosophical sense. But this move is not
warranted here. The notion of “qualitative” invoked by the participants
is different in at least two ways from the heavily metaphysical
philosophical sense.
The first difference is that the q-character is not thought of as
necessary for being a SIL-conscious experiencer. In question 7, the
results suggest that people find possible an entity whose experience
does not consist of “subjective feels, tastes, colors, sounds, etc., but
rather of objective measures.” And what is more, such an entity was
considered an “experiencer,” so long as the entity was a naturally
“intelligent creature” and not an “intelligent robot.” Recall that the
intelligent robot was rated as possible, just not an experiencer. This
possibility was further supported by question 9 in which participants
ranked as an experiencer a person who had no qualitative senses, but
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rather different sense modalities that “reported” directly to the speech
recognition center. This sense of qualia is pointedly different from
philosophical qualia, which are understood as necessary for being an
experiencer and so closely linked to conscious experience that the
problem of philosophical qualia is often taken to be identical to the
problem of conscious experience. As we will see below, this has
implications for the “hard problem” of consciousness. The second
difference is that unlike philosophical qualia, the q-character invoked
by the folk in the experiment is not “heavily” metaphysical in the
sense of being thought of as something that could possibly be absent
from the physical system of which it is a part. It was clear that in the
way that participants were thinking of being an experiencer, it is not
something that can be disconnected from the physical along the lines
of zombie or other absent qualia examples (questions 1 and 8). If this
is correct, then how the folk think about inner experience suggests
that we should decide that zombies are not possible in the relevant
sense.
Finally, question 10 offers preliminary evidence that the folk do
not have a readily awakened latent conception of qualia in the
philosophical sense of something that may be severed from the
physical system of which it is a part. Very few of the responses (7 of
123) hinted at anything remotely like qualia or phenomenality shifting
as a possible explanation for why the coffee taster is mixing up the
two coffees. This further supports the claim that folk conceptions of
the q-character of experience and philosophical qualia are quite
different.

6.4. Limitations
The qualia considered here were primarily sensory, and
generally not the other three standard qualitative kinds: bodily
sensations; felt emotions; and felt moods. Question 7, with the
intelligent creature/robot whose experience was objective, was the
only attempt in the direction of qualia in a broader sense than sensory,
but it would be rash to conclude too much from the fact that
participants thought such an entity was possible and also an
experiencer. Question 9, concerning the person with senses reporting
sensory information in linguistic form directly to a speech center,
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might be modified to include bodily, emotional, and mood information
also being reported in linguistic form.
A next step in exploring whether entities or states are more
fundamental would be an experimental design that employed an
inferential comparison of variance of subject responses to questions
about relative amounts of qualia involved in various mental
states and by various kinds of experiencers. If the majority of the
variance in such an experiment were accounted for by the different
experiencers as opposed to experiential states, this would further
confirm the “trumping” role of the conception of experiencer over
state. Such an experiment would be especially compelling because it
would depend less on subject and experimenter interpretations.11
Even if the results here are generalizable about sensory qualia,
a question remains as to whether folk understandings of SILexperience must include at least some non-sensory qualitative
features. In particular, our SIL-consciousness seems to have a
qualitative “experiential tone” (Seager, 1999, p. 95) that is most
noticeable, for example, when it becomes decidedly pleasant after a
margarita or two. Is this “experiential tone” part of the q-aspect or the
s-aspect of experience? As I have divided these two aspects of
conscious experience, the s-aspect includes structural/functional
properties like a unity, aspect/parts, temporal progression, present,
past, and future, and relationships among its various experiential
aspects (temporal, similarity, difference, identity, logical, rational,
causal, etc.). But must it perhaps also include a global qualitative
aspect like a general experiential tone? Moods, emotions, and mental
states in general that are associated with affective valences have been
shown to play an important, if unclear, role in attributing experience.
My results bear this out. The results concerning the possibility of an
experiencer without emotions hover right at “unsure” in terms of the
mean, and the distribution’s high standard deviation make it clear that
the issue divides people. Related to this, the non-emotional character
Spock was the entity that was ranked closest to “unsure”; participants
had a difficult time deciding the importance of emotions in “being an
experiencer.”
Among other things perhaps, what needs to be better
understood is how and why emotions factor in so heavily for some
non-philosophers. In particular, it is not clear how the folk understand
emotions. It may even be that emotions are a crucial factor in
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attributions of “experiencer,” and yet not in virtue of their qualitative
aspect, but rather a moral or empathetic connection. And even if a
qualitative aspect does turn out to be part of being an experiencer in
the folk scheme, I have offered here another model and some
preliminary evidence that such a concept is not the philosophers’
heavily metaphysical version. In any event, if the philosophical sense
of sensory qualia are nonessential to our concept of “being an
experiencer,” as this study suggests, then there is room to question
the construal of the “hard problem” of consciousness as I take up
below.12

6.5. The “Hard Problem” and Folk Phenomenality
The “hard problem” of consciousness is directly implicated in the
question of what is clearly and intuitively true of experience.
Philosophers from Block to Churchland and from Dennett to Goldman
assume that philosophical and folk conceptions of subjective
experience are the same, and if this is not the case, philosophers may
well have been inventing rather than solving puzzles about subjective
experience. In particular, the “hard problem” (Chalmers) and perhaps
even the “explanatory gap” (Levine) depend on an understanding of
subjective experience that includes a metaphysically robust qualitative
component, one that is not present in the folk conception of subjective
experience, if these results are correct.
While S&M and I both find reason to reject the assumptions that
give rise to the “hard problem,” it is worth examining our distinct
details. S&M argue that experimental studies of attribution behavior
show that there are not any second-order phenomenological properties
that apply to all the mental states that philosophers normally consider
as having phenomenological properties. As such, their case depends
on a critical auxiliary assumption, namely, that all the different mental
states considered by philosophers to be phenomenological (sensory
states, bodily position/state awareness, feelings, emotions, and
moods) have sufficiently uniform presuppositions and other application
conditions, and that one may test the question by examining how the
folk attribute these across modalities (seeing red, feeling pain, etc.)
and across subject types (humans and robots). As I have argued
above, my findings do not support this. I found reason to believe that
the folk have systematically different conceptions of these kinds of
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states, that they have deeply distinct presuppositions about “artificial”
experiencers, and that some of their mental state attributions
concerning subjective experience do involve a “phenomenological”
(qualitative) aspect.
Nonetheless, I agree with S&M that findings like these should
give one pause about whether there is a “hard problem” or
unbridgeable explanatory gap. If correct, my results suggest that the
folk sense of being an experiencer does not depend on traditional
qualia, that is, on the kind that (by definition) is left over after all
functional properties of the brain/body system are explained. Call this
traditional sense “m-qualia” (metaphysical), as it is the kind that can
be conceived of as separable from the physical system composing an
experiencer. The folk appear to employ a distinct conception of the
qualitative character of experience. Call it “p-qualia” (for “physical” or
“pholk”), and it has some of the properties of m-qualia: it is qualitative
in that it concerns how the experience “actually appears/feels” to the
subject, it is private/perspectival, and it is practically ineffable. But pqualia are still ultimately tied to the physical. Hence, p-qualia are not
the sort that “hard problem” arguments need to get off the ground. In
fact, p-qualia are rather similar to Dennett’s (1988) replacement for
the m-qualia he attempted to “Quine.”13

7. Concluding Remarks
The picture of subjective experience that begins to emerge from
this study falls somewhere between the accounts offered by “hard
problem” philosophers and S&M’s position that the folk conception
lacks a phenomenological component. People have a concept of an
experiencer in the SIL-sense that they apply readily to humans and
some other animals. Whether this concept is at play helps fix whether
(some) mental state attributions have a folk qualitative component.
The features of the folk conception of subjective experience that
emerge support viewing the SIL-consciousness of a subject as a
holistic notion that does not a priori reduce to the set of mental states
with phenomenological properties and that includes a metaphysically
thin sense of the qualitative aspect of experience.
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Notes
[1] I note also Huebner’s (2010) work, which is in conversation with S&M
(2010) and much of the literature of the previous paragraph.
[2] Buckwalter and Phelan (forthcoming) offer a distinct challenge to parts of
S&M (2010), primarily their positive (valence) hypothesis about what
underlies folk attribution of subjective experience.
[3] The particular FDR method used was the BY method from Benjamini and
Yekutieli (2001).
[4] Gray and Weger use the term ‘experience-less’ for such people and
characterize them as unable to “feel pain, pleasure or fear or
otherwise experience what a normal person can experience” (2012, p.
128); the persons in a coma and under general anesthesia in this
study certainly qualify “experience-less” in this sense.
[5] Following S&M (2010, p. 312, note 13), this tests whether variations like
“S is angry” versus “S feels angry” make a difference specifically for
attributions of affective states. See S&M (2009) for further discussion
of such differences.
[6] It is a limitation of this study that the order of the questions in parts 1
and 2 was not counterbalanced to control for framing effects.
[7] In general, such demand bias is poorly understood; see McCambridge, de
Bruin, and Witton (2012) for a recent survey of literature on demand
characteristic bias in non-laboratory settings. They suggest, among
other things, that such bias is not well understood and appears to be
heavily context dependent, and that “unqualified use of the term
demand characteristics is not only questionable but should be
abandoned” (2012, concluding paragraph).
[8] My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
[9] An anonymous reviewer has made the plausible suggestion that S&M’s
position is actually that the distribution would be bimodal, though they
do not say so explicitly. Even so, the bimodal prediction would still be
trumped by the systemic starting assumption that the robot is not an
experiencer that triggers the informational sense of “seeing.”
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[10] The Integrated Information account of consciousness is an example of
this; see Tononi (2008), Balduzi and Tononi (2008), and Boly,
Massimini, and Tononi (2009).
[11] I owe thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
[12] Another potential limitation is that 75% of the participants indicated that
they believed in God and 60% that they are religious. As Gray,
Knickman, and Wegner (2011) have documented, belief in a
soul/afterlife affects one’s willingness to attribute mentality in cases
outside normally functioning human beings (in their case persistent
vegetative patients). More work is needed with nonbelievers and
“different believers,” e.g., “non-Western.”
[13] Dennett proposes PIP (phenomenal information property) detectors,
following Peter Bieri and Fred Dretske. His provocative suggestion
meshes rather well with a recent prominent scientific account of
consciousness and qualia, the Integrated Information account; see
Tononi (2008) and Peressini (2013) for a philosophical discussion.
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Table 1 Part 1 means and t-tests comparing means to the
“unsure” answer of 4. The significance of the t-tests are
indicated with asterisks as: *p , 0.05, **p , 0.01, and ***p ,
0.001.

Figure 1 Part 1 means with error bars indicating 99%
confidence interval.
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Table 2 Part 1 pair-wise mean comparisons. The subsets are
generated by FDR pair-wise comparisons using the BY method
from Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001) in which the null hypothesis
of equal means is not rejected. Means listed in columns.
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Table 3 Part 1 Principle Component Analysis Matrix with
communalities. The rotated method was Varimax with Kaiser
Normalization. Values are shown for significant loadings (jxj $
0.5); salient loadings (0.4 # jxj , 0.5) are indicated by “*”;
marginal loadings (0.3 # jxj , 0.4) are indicated by “-”; zero
loadings (jxj , 0.3) are left blank.

Table 4 Part 2 means and t-tests comparing means to the
“unsure” answer of 4. The significance of the t-tests are
indicated with asterisks as: *p , 0.05, **p , 0.01, and ***p ,
0.001.
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Figure 2 Part 2 (single version questions) means with error bars
indicating 99% confidence interval.

Figure 3 Part 2 (multiple version questions) means with error
bars indicating 99% confidence interval.
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Table 5 Part 2, question 10 (subjective experience shift)
explanation types with number and percentage of total (N ¼
123).

Figure 4 Part 2, question 10 (subjective experience shift)
explanation types with number and percentage of total (N ¼
123).
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